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CURRENT DECISIONS
Admiralty-UNSEAWORTHINESS-INSTANTANEOUS
LIGENCE. Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 91

OPERATIONAL

NEG-

S. Ct. 514 (1971).

Petitioner, a longshoreman, brought suit in a federal district court in
admiralty to recover damages for injuries caused by the alleged unseaworthiness of a vessel. He had been engaged in loading operations from
a lighter alongside the S.S. EdgarF. Luckenbach when, as a consequence
of the negligent operation of cargo gear by fellow longshoremen, he was
struck by a cargo sling. The district court denied respondent's motion
for summary judgement, predicated upon the ground that a single negligent act by a fellow longshoreman could not render the ship unseaworthy, but granted him leave to take an interlocutory appeal.' The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that "'[i] nstant
unseaworthiness' resulting from 'operational negligence' of the stevedoring contractor is not a basis for recovery by an injured longshoreman." 2
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's p6sition, holding that this "isolated" and "wholly unforseeable act of negligence" did not render the vessel unseaworthy.' This decision is tantamount to holding that an instantaneous act of operational negligence, in
itself, is insufficient to breach the warranty of seaworthiness4 owed to
"seamen" 5 by the shipowner.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1964).
2. Luckenbach Overseas Corp. v. Usner, 413 F.2d 984, 985-86 (5th Cir. 1969).
3. Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 91 S. Ct. 514, 518 (1971).
4. See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 94-95 (1946), wherein the Court
states that the warranty of seaworthiness
is essentially a species of liability without fault, analogous to other well
known instances in our law. Derived from and shaped to meet the hazards
which performing the service imposes, the liability is neither limited by
conceptions of negligence nor contractual in character .... It is a form of
absolute duty owing to all within its humanitarian policy.
See also Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1959), defining the extent
of the absolute duty to which Sieracki referred.
What has been said is not to suggest that the owner is obligated to furnish
an accident-free ship. The duty is aboslute, but it is a duty only to
furnish a vessel and appurtenances reasonably fit for their intended use.
The standard is not perfection but reasonable fitness; not a ship that will
weather every conceivable storm or withstand every imaginable peril of
the sea, but a vessel reasonably suitable for her intended service.
Despite the fact that Mitchell extended the scope of unseaworthiness to include "transitory" unseaworthiness, this language provides the basis for the restriction of the
doctrine in Usrner.
5. See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946), first extending the warranty
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Martitime law is uniquely judge-made law;' nowhere is this more evident than in the development of the doctrine of unseaworthiness. From
obscure origins, 7 the Supreme Court has fashioned a mighty weapon 8 in
the arsenal of actions for injury and death9 that are available to seamen
and other restricted groups of maritime workers. This development has
not taken place without difficulty, however, primarily in the area of fixing the perimeters of a cause of action founded upon a pure policy
decision.'0
Although the present seaworthiness doctrine was clearly announced
in the 1944 decision of Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co.," it was the decision in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki12 two years later that established
the basic elements of the cause of action 1 3 and gave rise to numerous questions regarding the scope of the doctrine. In Sieracki, a longshoreman
was injured when a defective shackle broke, causing a boom and tackle
to fall upon him. Visual inspection would not have prevented this occurrence because the defect was later determined to have been in the
forging. By concluding that the injured longshoreman was a "seaman"
for the purpose of recovery under the seaworthiness doctrine, 4 and that
the shipowner's dity to provide a seaworthy ship was absolute and not
predicated upon negligence,' 5 the Court committed itself to a policy
to longshoremen. Sieracki formulated a test to establish the classes of maritime workers
to whom the shipowner owed the duty of providing a seaworthy vessel:
It is that for injuries incurred while working on board the ship in navigable
waters the stevedore is entitled to the seaman's traditional and statutory
protections, regardless of the fact that he is employed immediately by
another than the owner. For these purposes he is, in short, a seaman
because he is doing a seaman's work and incurring a seaman's hazards.
ld. at 99.
6. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20-21 (1963).
7. See generally G. GIImoRE & C. BLACK, ThE LAW OF ADMnlTiYv 315-17 (1957);
Benbow, Seaworthiness and Seamen, 9 MiA.v

L.Q. 418, 418-23

(1955); Tetreault,

Seamen, Seaworthiness, and the Rights of Harbor Workers, 39 CoN_.LL L.Q. 381, 38696 (1954).
8. In reflecting on the growth of the doctrine, G. GxuMoan & C. BLACK, THE LAw OF
ADaurArY 315 (1957) indicates that "[today the unseaworthiness doctrine has become
the principal vehicle for personal injury recovery."
9. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 90 S. Ct. 1772 (1970), recently authorizing
a recovery in the general maritime law for wrongful death under the doctrine of unseaworthiness.
10. See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 91-100 (1946).
11. 321 U.S. 96, 99-100 (1944).
12. 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
13. See note 4 supra.
14. 328 U.S. at 99.

15. Id. at 94.
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that threatened the continued viability of both the Jones Act 6 and the
Longshoreman's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.' 7 It remained
for the Court in subsequent cases to determine the classes of maritime
workers to whom the shipowner's duty of a seaworthy ship was owed,
the party who would bear the cost of a breach of the duty, and what
defects would constitute an unseaworthy condition. The Court addressed the last issue in Usner, restricting further expansion of the negligence-defect coverage within the unseaworthiness doctrine.
Conditions of unseaworthiness have included defects in the vessel arising through the actions of incompetent personnel, 8 defects in the ship's
structure 9 and equipment,20 defects in cargo containers, 2 ' improper stowage of cargo, 2 and faulty equipment brought aboard from without the
ship.as The warranty of seaworthiness is breached even when these defects arise as inherent characteristics of the personnel or equipment without negligence or knowledge on the part of the shipowner.24 While it
is clear that operational negligence on the part of the crew 25 or an independent contractor2 6 can also give rise to a defect constituting unseaworthiness, it has not been clear whether a single, isolated act of operational negligence can, of itself, give rise to a cause of action for unseaworthiness.
In Plamals v. S.S. Pinar Del Rio,27 a deck officer negligently selected
16. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964). This section was formerly section 33 of the Merchant
Marine Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 1007, popularly known as the Jones Act, which authorizes
recovery for wrongful injury and death as provided under the Federal Employers'
Liability Acts. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1964).
17. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901 etseq. (1964).
18. See, e.g., Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336, 338-40 (1955); Keen
v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 194 F.2d 515, 517-18 (2d Cir. 1952).
19. See, e.g., Crumady v. The J. H. Fisser, 358 U.S. 423, 426-28 (1959); Seas Shipping
Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 87-88 (1946).
20. See, e.g., Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 103 (1944).
21. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 373 US. 206, 212-14 (1963);
Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 364 (1962).
22. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 211 F.2d 277, 279 (2d Cir. 1954).
See also Morales v. City of Galveston, 370 U.S. 165, 170 (1962) (dictum).
23. See, e.g., Petterson v. Alaska S.S. Co., 205 F.2d 478, 478-80 (9th Cir. 1953),
aff'd per curkam, 374 U.S. 396 (1954).
24. Cf. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 549 (1960); Petterson v.
Alaska S.S. Co., 205 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir. 1953).
25. See, e.g., Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 103-04 (1944); Mollica v.
Compania Sud Americana De Vapores, 202 F.2d 25, 26-27 (2d Ci. 1953).
26. See, e.g., Mascuilli v. United States, 387 U.S. 237 (1967), reV'g per curiam, 358
F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1966); Grillea v. United States, 232 F.2d 919, 922-23 (2d Cir. 1956).

27. 277 U.S. 151 (1928).
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defective rope, when good rope was available, resulting in an injury
when the rope parted. The Court found that this type of operational
negligence did not constitute an unseaworthy condition2s This facet
of Plamals was subsequently overruled in Mahnich, and questions
therefore arose as to precisely when operational negligence would
amount to a breach of the warranty of seaworthiness. In Mitchell v.
Trawler Racer, Inc., 0 the Supreme Court resolved this confusion, holding that a "transitory" unseaworthy condition, occurring after the inception of a voyage, whether caused by operational negligence or otherwise, constituted a cause of action. 1 The Court saw a "complete divorcement of unseaworthiness liability from concepts of negligence." 32 Vhile
ruling out the necessity of negligence and knowledge on the part of the
shipowner, the Court implemented a standard of reasonableness in its
definition of the shipowner's duty to supply a seaworthy ship.
The standard is not perfection, but reasonable fitness; not a ship
that will weather every conceivable storm or withstand every
imaginable peril of the sea, but a vessel reasonably suitable for her
33
intended service.
This standard is important in the evaluation of instantaneous operational negligence because, despite the dangerous condition brought about
by the act of negligence, the ship, her personnel, structure, and appurtenances may retain a quality of reasonable fitness for intended service.3

In Crumady vu. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser,35 the Court found that
operational negligence of the longshoremen aboard brought into play an
unseaworthy condition of the vessel; the circuit breaker on the winch
was set at twice the safe working load of the gear. The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals had found that "the gear was not proved to have been
unseaworthy, neither was the setting of the cut off device established
as a legal cause of the accident which occurred." 36 In light of the cir28. Id. at 155.
29. 321 U.S. at 104-05.
30. 362 U.S. 539 (1959).

31. Id. at 549. Cf. Petterson v. Alaska S.S. Co, 205 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953), aff'd
per curiam, 347 U.S. 396 (1954); Poignant v. United States, 225 F.2d 595 (2d Cir. 1955).
32. 362 U.S. at 550.
33. Id.
34. This is precisely the theory utilized to deny recovery" in the principal case.
See Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 91 S. Ct. 514, 518 (1971).
35. 358 U.S. 423 (1959).
36. 249 F2d 818, 820-21 (3d Cir. 1957).
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cuit court's factual resolution, Crumady, as decided by the Supreme
Court, might well have supported the proposition that operational negligence in itself could constitute an unseaworthy condition. The Court's
per curiam decision in Mascuilli v. United States,3 7 reversing the Third
Circuit's finding that "the vessel and its equipment were in a seaworthy
condition at all times throughout the loading operations, and that the
accident was caused solely by the negligent operation of the stevedoring crew. . ." 38 seemed to substantiate this view. In the absence of an

inherent defect in the vessel or its gear, and in light of the sudden development of the incident resulting from the negligence of the longshoremen, Mascuilli can be seen in terms of at least the indorsement of
the principle that operating negligence alone could constitute an unseaworthy condition.
Prior to the Mascuilli decision, the virtually unanimous position of the
lower federal courts was that operational negligence alone did not give
rise to such a condition 9 However, in the wake of Mascuilli a sharp
split developed in the circuits4" over whether the decision was a broad
expansion of the seaworthiness doctrine. 4 ' The standard of a vessel "reasonably suited for her intended service" appeared to have been superceded by a determination by the Court to further develop the Sieracki
policy of treating shipboard injury as an expense of the maritime industry. If instantaneous operational negligence was to be equated to unseaworthiness, then the maritime industry was to bear strict liability for
the injury or the death that occurred when the duty of seaworthiness
existed.
The Sieracki extension of the seaworthiness doctrine to the longshore37. 387 U.S. 237' (1967). See 42 TuL. L. Rzv. 648 (1968) raising doubts as to the
precise meaning of Mascuilli and calling for clarification.
38. 358 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1966).
39. See, e.g., Grant v. Cia Anonima Venezolana de Navegacion, 343 F.2d 757, 757-58
(5th Cir. 1965); Massa v. C.A. Venezuelan Navigacion, 332 F.2d 779, 781 (2d Cir. 1964);
Spinelli v. Isthmian S.S. Co., 326 F.2d 870, 871 (2d Cir. 1964); Neal v. Lykes Bros.
S.S. Co., 306 F.2d 313, 316 (5th Cir. 1962); Morrell v. United States, 297 F.2d 662, 663-64
(9th Cir. 1961); Green v. Skibs A/S Mandeville, 292 F.2d 393, 393-94 (4th Cir. 1961);
Ventrone v. United States, 239 F.2d 862 (2d Cit. 1957). Contra, Radovich v. Cunard
S.S. Co, 364 F.2d 149, 151-53 (2d Cir. 1966); Scott v. Isbrandtsen Co, 327 F.2d 113, 124-25
(4th Ci. 1964); Ferrante v. Swedish American Lines, 331 F.2d 571, 577-78 (3d Cit.
1964). See also 42 Tt.. L. REv. 648, 649 (1968).
40. See 91 S. Ct. 516 n.2.
41. See, e.g., La Capria v. Compagnie Maritime Beige, 427 F.2d 244, 246 n.1 (2d Cit.
1970); Tarabocchia v. Zim Israel Navigation Co., 417 F.2d 476, 478 (2d Cir. 1969);
Cleary v. United States Lines Co., 411 F.2d 1009, 1010 (2d Cir. 1969); Venable v. A/S
Det Forenede Dampskibsselslcab, 399 F.2d 347, 350-51 (4th Cir. 1968).

V971]

CURRENT DECISIONS

man has drawn extensive academic criticism stemming from the unfairness of the additional financial burden imposed upon the maritime industry, shipowner, and stevedore, and the siphoning off of a high per43
centage of the claimant's recovery by administrative and attorney costs
In addition, it was unclear whether the Longshoreman's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act was, on the average, as protective of the
interests of these workers as was the Sieracki extension."
The Usner decision reflects an element of rethinking in this area. Mr.
Justice Stewart, who had opposed certiorari in Mascuilli,45 indicated that
certiorari had been granted46 because of a conflict among the circuits on
the basic issue presented.47 As he described it, the issue presented went
.to the very definition of what unseaworthiness is and what it is not." 48
The opinion reemphasized the standard of reasonableness in determining
the condition of unseaworthiness as enunciated in Mitchell and found
that "[w] hat caused the petitioner's injuries in the present case ... was

not the condition of the ship, her appurtenances, her cargo or her crew,
but the isolated personal negligent act of the petitioner's fellow longshoreman." 49 Usner, in limiting the logically anticipated expansion of
the Sieracki doctrine and vindicating the reasonableness standard of
Mitchell, has presented a definitive statement that instantaneous operational negligence does not equate to unseaworthiness. 50 Thus, in only
42. See Shields & Byrne, Application of the "Unseaworthiness" Doctrine to Longshore1137, 1147-52 (1963); Foley, A Survey of the Maritime Doctrine
of Seaworthiness, 46 ORE. L. REv. 369, 398, 407, 420-21 (1967); Mank, The Stevedore:
Hope for Rescue, 56 A.B.AJ. 254, 256 (1970); Comment, The "Unseaworthiness" Doctrine and Its Application to Longshoremen, 22 MIAMI L. REv. 937, 946-51 (1968); Comment, Expanding the Warranty of Sea-worthiness: Social Welfare or Marithne Disaster, 9
VtL. L. Rev. 422, 427-40 (1964). See also Skibinsli v. Waterman S.S. Corp, 360 F.2d
539, 543-44 (2d Cit. 1966) (Friendly, J., dissenting). But see Note, Risk Distribution
and Unseaworthiness, 75 YALE L.J. 1174 (1966) evaluating the criticism leveled at
Sieracki and proposing retention of the seaworthiness doctrine coupled with a locality
test to determine high risk eligibility.
43. See, e.g., Shields & Byrne, Application of the Seaworthiness Doctrine to Longshoremen, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 1137, 1147-51 (1963).
44. Id. at 1147-48.
45. 387 U.S. at 237.
46. Usner v. Luckenbach Overeas Corp., 397 U.S. 933 (1970).
47. 91 S. Ct. at 516 n.2.
48. Id. at 517.
49. Id.
50. Usner represents a new policy decision restricting the growth of the seaworthiness doctrine and appears to negate the equation of instantaneous operational negligence
and unseaworthiness. Nevertheless, Crumady and Mascuilli although not overruled,
stand very close to the dividing line between unseaworthiness and instantaneous opera-

men, 111 U. PA. L. REv.
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two situations may ordinary operational negligence create an unseaworthy condition: by bringing into play a previously unseaworthy condition, or by creating an unseaworthy condition which, after a break in
the continuity of events, subsequently causes injury.
FRANK

F. ARNEss

Constitutional Law-RAcIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 91 S. Ct. 849 (1971).

Griggs and twelve other black employees brought this class action
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 to enjoin Duke Power
Company from discriminating against them. 2 Prior to 1965, when the

Act went into effect, Duke employed negroes only in its labor department. Thereafter, Duke required a high school diploma and satisfactory
scores on two aptitude tests for all new employees-black and whitewho wished to transfer to any other department.' The district court
found no violation, holding that the tests were probably related to
necessary job skills.4 The court of appeals agreed that there was no
violation, holding that such tests need not be job-related.'
tional negligence. The Court in Usner distinguished the earlier decision of Crwnady
in terms of a defective winch and Mascuilli in terms of a prior unseaworthy condition
arising from the tightline condition. In following MitchelPs standard of reasonableness,
Usner is technically on firm ground, but Mr. Justice Harlan, in his dissent also appears
correct in stating that "Crumady cannot justly be distinguished" from Usner. 91 S. Ct.
at 520. While litigation on the question of whether instantaneous operational negligence
equates to unseaworthiness should abate as a consequence of Usner, the voluminous
and costly litigation on the other aspects of unseaworthiness will continue.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (2) (1964) provides that:
It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer-... (2) to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
race....
Id. § 2000e-2(h) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this [tide], it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to give and to act
upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that
such test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed,
intended, or used to discriminate because of race....
2. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243, 244 (MD. N.C. 1968).
3. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 91 S. Ct. 849, 852 (1971).
4. 292 F. Supp. at 250.
5. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1235 (4th Cir. 1970).

